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STATEMENT OF THE CASE; 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal From the district courts Order granting Respondents Motion for Summary Judgment. 
William Lightner (WL) is an Appellant currently incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC). 
Appellant Marcia Lightner (ML) is his wife. Appellants filed this action pursuant to 43 USC 1983, claiming 
that their constitutional rights were violated when Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) officials 
repeatedly suspended ML's visiting privileges. Appellants fiuthcr claim that IDOC policy and procedures 
(P&P) are vague and unconstitutional. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
WL is legally married to ML (R., p. 33, @lo). He is currently incarcerated under IDOC control, and ' 
has been at all times relevant to this action. (R., p 32). On 10 April 07 ML was arrested under 1C 18-205 (R., 
P 33 @ 11) and accepted a plea agreement for a misdemeanor and probation. As a result of ML's arrest her 
visiting privileges were terminated on 12 April 07 (R., p 33 @ 12), and reinstated by warden Blades in July 07 
(R., Ex. 4. p. 3 @ 7), after missing 41 visits. 
In August 2007 respondent Hardison replaced Blades as warden, and on 1 October 07 Suspended 
ML's visiting privileges, a second time, for the same 10 April 07 arrest. (R., Ex. 4. p. 4 @ 8). Appellants 
began the appeals process but were blocked, when warden Hardison bypassed steps one and two, answering 
the initial concern from the position of Appellate Authority and created an estoppel. (R., p. 70). 
Appellants filed a Civil Rights complaint (R., p. 7) and Amended it on 16 Jan 08 (R., p. 31). 
Respondents responded to both (R., p 21) and (R., p. 44) before tiling a Motion for Summary Judgment on 21 
Nov. 08 (R., p 5). Appellants responded to Motion for Summary Judgment (R., p 54) and a hearing was held 
on 22 Dec. 08 (Tr., pp 32-78) which resulted in the district court granting Defendants motion for summary 
Judgment. Appellants filcd a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied (12 Feb 09 and 13 March 09), 
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and filed a Notice of appeal on 11 March 09 (R., p. 84). 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 
WAS APPELLANTS' CLAIM PROPERLY DISMISSED BY SUMMARY .JUDGMENT FOR 
FAILURE TO EXHAUST THE ISCl GREIVANCE PROCESS? AND WERE APPELLANTS 
ENTITLED TO A TFUAL BY JURY? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This claim is atypical in nature as to the fulfillment of the PLRA requirements as far as most inmate claims 
filed are concerned. The grievance system is designed so that the person of least responsibility and closest to 
the incident of concern is assigned the first step of the process. If a resolution camot be obtained which 
satisfies the inmate's issue, a fonnal grievance may be filed to aWReviewing Authority" as the second step. If 
still unsatisfied with the reply, the inmate may take a third step and appeal the decision to the Warden as the 
institutions facility head, and final "Appellant Authority" 
What makes this claim atypical is that it was warden Hardison himself acting as the "final Appellate 
Authority" that answered and responded to the initial concern. (R., 70) The IDOC Directives list the steps 
necessary for normal proceedings, but they give absolutely no direction in grievance procedures when the 
facility head, acting as the final authority, answers the initial concern. 
B. ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to the prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) ''[nlo action shall be brought with respect to 
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by prisoner confined in any jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 
U.S.C. $ 1997 e (a). 
The IDOC has a grievance procedure, which falls under the PLRA requirements and is contained in 
P&P Directive 3 16. In most instances this procedure consists of a three-step process, "Thnlprocess requires 
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/he offender to ( I )  seek an informal resolution qf the mailer by completing an offender concern form; (2) 
complete a grievance form if informal resolution can not be accomplished; and.finally (3) an appeal of the 
response to the grievance. " (R., Ex 2, p. 3. #4). 
Because in this instance the PLRA process was atypical, the P&P Directive 316 is unconstitutionally 
vague and does not give a clear path to follow, 04.00.00. Definitions list thc Reviewing Authority as the 
Deputy Warden and the Facility Head as the Warden. The Directive states at 05.02.01 that," An ofender shall 
try to solve his issue or problem informully by using a concern form before filing a grievance." 05.02.02 
continues the PLRA requirements by explaining the second step. It states in relative part that "The offender 
must state the action that the offender believes the reviewing authority [depu@ warden, by deJinition] should 
fake ... the grievance shall be assigned to the most applicable slag but not fhe same stafwho responded to the 
concern. " 
In this occasion, the warden, acting as "Appellate Authority" answered the initial concern form (R., 
70). This leaves no room for the offender to file a grievance as to the second step, or an appeal as the third 
step, because it had already been responded to by the "Appellate Authority". It waq the warden who 
circumvented the procedure. In Defendant's Response brief they quote a Sttpreme Court decision that "The 
benefit fo  exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system is given a fair opportuniiy to 
consider the grievance. The prison grievance system will not huve such an opportunity unless the grieved 
complies with the systems crilical procedural rules." Woodford v. Neo, 548 U.S. at 95 (2006) (p.6). It 
should therefore be pointed out, that it was the Warden answering the initial concern form, not as Warden, but 
as the final "Appellate Authority" (R., 70) who voided and bypassed the grievance procedure. 
On pg. 8, of Respondents Brief they summarize the Directive 316 grievance policy. Following this 
summary of the second step they write, "gthe inmate is unsatisfied with the reviewing authority's decision, he 
may proceed to the third step by filing a grievance appeal. The grievance appeal is logged and forwarded to 
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the ap~ellate aurhorifv, usually the warden, for rhejnal decision. " 
There is nothing in [DOC Directive 316 that prohibits an offender from grieving a warden's decision. 
In fact, the Directive states at 02.01.001 that grievance coordinator will file the grievance with the "most 
applicable stax hut not the same staff who responded to the concern. " This is where Directive 3 16 becomes 
vague. 
When answering the initial concern form, the Warden did not just answer it as the Warden. Instead, he 
answered it as the "Appellate Authority" and by passed Appellant's grievance opportunity. (R., 70) Directive 
3 16 lists the "Appellate Authority as the final step. Appellants claim that it was the Warden who violated the 
steps of Directive 316 when he answered the concern form as if it were the third (31d) step of the procedure. 
When he answered as the "Appellate Authority" he completed PLRA requirements. 
Furthermore, this was confirmed to Appellant (WL), when unit correctional officers (CO's) told him 
he could "Not" grieve the issue (R., Ex. 5, pg. 3, #12-13, 17). Being told by unit CO's that the grievance 
process was completed when Appellants attempted to confirm this by appealing direct to the director's office. 
(R., Ex. 5 pg. 3 # 1T5-16) (R., Ex. 6 pg. 6 # 22-23). 
Appellants also note that, ML is neither an employee nor an offender. She therefore is not bound by 
the rules established by the PLRA. As an Appellant in the complaint, and not an employee or offender, PLRA 
exhaustion rules do not apply, and should not have been considered for summary judgment. Directive 
Number 3 16.02.01.001 (page 2 of 7) further goes on to state: 
"Offender- A person under the legal care, custody, supervision or authority 
of the Board including a person within or wilhout the state pursuant to 
agreement with another state or contractor." 
The district court did not attempt to dismiss WL, who is an offender, as an Appellant for failure to 
exhaust PLRA requirements. Instead, thc lower court used the PLRA requirement to dismiss the cntire case 
by summary judgment in spite of the fact that ML was not bound by PLRA requirements. 
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Defendants have also used the case of Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 204 (2007) stating that, 
"...exhausting the grievance process would have given Warden Hardison the opportuniw to reconsider his 
decision (Response briefpage 10). This contradicts Directive 3 16 at 02.01.001 that; the grievance will not 
be answered by "...the Tame staff that responded to the concern." And Warden Hardison was the Appellate 
Authority. 
When unit CO's told Appellant WL his appeal process was complete, and his concern form was 
answered by Appellate Authority, he had an estoppel to further PLRA appeal. Having used the prison 
grievance system in the pas!, there is sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that Appellant WL knew the 
procedure (R., 74-75). When this normal procedure was barred and became atypical in nature, with no 
understandable Directive to turn to in this instance, Appellant WL was told by unit CO's he had exhausted his 
in-house remedies. The Booth v. Church, 531 U.S. 956, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1824-25 (2001) Court held that 
prisoners are required to exhaust administrative remedies because of the possibility of relief. Appellants 
claim is atypical, in that there was no possibility of relief. No ISCI staff personnel had the power or authority 
to override the Wardens decision as Appellate Authority. The Warden cannot, by Directive, review his own 
decision, and the Directors office (Jeff Zarnuta) stated that they were not part of the appeal process that the 
Wardens decision is final. I-Ie would stand by the warden's decision. Furthermore, because Appellate review 
is the final step of the appeal process, and the Warden responded as Appellate Authority (R., 70), the 
possibility of relief was non-existent. 
In addition, the court denied Defendant's Motion for Dismissal for failure to exhaust remedies 
under the PLRA in the case of Davis v. Wochrer, 32 F .  Supp. 2d 1078 (E.D. W1 1999) ruling that the 
exhaustion requirements of the PLRA does not apply where the Appellant is pursuing monetary damages, and 
the prison grievance system and procedure does not provide for monetary relief. Likewise, Appellants here 
have asked for monetary damages for each visit lost. This is not achievable through the prison grievance 
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system. 
It is enough that Appellants claim for monetary damages; arise from alleged violations for denial of 
procedural due process in their revocation. Appellants clearly had an established liberty interest in their 
visiting privileges which they brought with civil rights action under a 1983 claim Henrv v. Sanchez, 923 F .  
Supp 1266 (CD. CA 1996). 
Defendants' counsel argues that Appellant WL could appeal Warden Harrison's decision; however, 
the lDOC did not provide and does not provide any forins or P&P for inmates to grieve the warden. 
Defendant Hardison did not follow the P&P that was written for him to follow based on 604.02.01.001 p.21 of 
25, and also argued in : (Tr. p.70 17-25 and Tr. p.71, 1-14), "in terminating the visiting privileges goes 
through a step-by-step process of how each step is recorded. When you get to the facility head, it states: (1) 
Schedule a meeting with the visitor. Next s t e ~ ,  the facilitv head discusses the reason for the 
termination, the aaalicable visiting rules, and ex~ectations for visiting conduct. (2) Next s t e ~  reads, 
The facilitv head reviews the offender's file and institutional behavior. (3) Next stea reads, Faciliq 
head makes the decision to continue termination, reinstate with restrictions or without restrictions. (41 
Next s t e ~  says: The facilitv head sends notice of the decision to the visitor, offender, and visiting room 
staff." Warden Hardison skipped all P&P steps that provided Appellant MZ, her due process right to be heard -
by terminating her visiting on the phone followed by a letter of termination. (R., 70) 
In the case of Izalt, et al.. K Anderson et al., Civil # 77-1066 (1979) (appealed by visitorpursuant to 
the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code Sections 67-5201 et seg.), the U.S. District court gave an 
Order and Judgment concerning Visiting P&P, and Defendants agreed to adopt the following rules and 
regulations set forth before visiting could be terminated. IDOC was Ordered and required to provide due 
process prior to termination of visiting. They accepted the procedure under lzatt to give Due Process. This 
case set precedence to visiting P&P and applies to all visiting terminating issues, demanding through the 
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Order of how the process has to be handles before visits can be tcrrninated. Even though this case dealt with 
strip searches, it also deals with due process of visitation terminations which leaves the IDOC in the position 
to not being selective from one part of visiting to the other. They are bound to provide due process, held in 
Izalt, and by their own P&P which warden Hardison and IDOC officials ignored. Since due process hearing, 
was not afforded to Appellants it cicarly shows a violation had taken place. Therefore, by not following 
IDOC P&P or a Court Order that provides due process to Appellants, Defendants have no legal leg to stand 
on; no argument as to failure to complete the grievance process; therefore, Defendants should not have denied 
visitation or applied punishment before hand. It seems quite bizarre that Appellants are required to follow 
P&P, when Defendants have not followed the P&P or Court Order. 
AuueManb were Entitled to a Trial by  Jurv 
Oilc of the most fundamental rights possessed by Americans is the Constitutional right to a trial by 
jury. In filing this complaint, Appellants demanded the trial by jury they were entitled to (R., 42). In 
response, counsel for Defendants also demanded a jury trial (R., 44). As pointed out throughout this appeal, 
there are many issues of material fact in dispute. While still in controversy, the court has automatically and 
unconstitutionally accepted Defendants debatable statements and reported incidents as fact. They failed to 
consider that these "accepted statements" are highly disputed and a major source of the claimed harassment. 
Without even considering Appellants claim, the court made its decision without allowing Appellants to 
present their side of these events to a jury. The court based their decision solely on Defendants reply brief 
(R., 21) and disregarded the trial by jury both parties had demanded. 
A trial by jury is requested where evidence could be presented and witnesses could testify, for the jury 
to rule on the issues in dispute. Unfortunately, the court has denied Appellants that right. Oddly enough, of 
the three (3) issues presented in the 1983 claim, two (2) still remain unanswered or even mentioned in the 
courts ruling. For the court to deny the fundamental right to due process and a trial by jury guaranteed by law, 
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for the sake of expedience, is showing the same prejudicial treatment toward a member of a disfavored group 
that Defendants have shown. Furthermore, by failing to respond to the issues, the district court creates and 
estoppel to appeal. 
If provided the opportunity to a trial by jury, Appellants could have proven several issues in their case: 
1.  That harassment did exist, and several witnesses would have been called to testify to that effect. 
2. ML's clothing was not anything abnormal apposed to any other visitor, and many women and visitors 
were reprimanded for their clothing. 
3. Witnesses would have testified for Appellants as to retaliation and harassment from other visiting 
CO's; 
4. Witnesses would have testified that other women and girl friends of inmates were or had been felons 
on felony parole and allowed to visit, as well as testified that other women worked for the prisons in 
Idaho and remain visiting. 
Appellants had a Constitutional right to a trial by jury. 
ISSUE 2 
WERE APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the District Cows  Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R., 96), the 
Court gives its opinion centered solely on the inmate, in this case WL. The court completely ignores that fact 
that it was ML's visitation that was suspe~~ded and her rights were the rights violated by Defendant s actions. 
The Court gives various explanations as to why an inmate should not have visits, but ML is not an "inmate ". 
The Court also goes on to say, (R., 97): "aperson who haspending criminal charges or who is the suhject of 
a criminal investigation will not he allowed to visit an inmate, except upon written approval of the facility 
head or designee. " Warden Blades was a facility head, and did give written permission based on his 
dissection. This permission should not have been over-ridden unless a due process hearing was afforded 
Appellants. The Court's oversight show an abuse of its discretion by not taking into consideration the liberty 
interest that came into effect for Appellants during the second termination of their visits. ML was innocent 
until proven guilty of the charge, therefore should have been acknowledged by district court. 
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Although visiting may be considered a privilege, the loss of a privilcge is punishment. To be punished 
without due process is unconstitutional. Appellants claim that in suspending their visits, Defendants should 
have provided them with a due process hearing. Why should the loss of "visiting" privileges be treated as any 
less, or any different, than when other infractions cause the loss of privileges to occur, andlor sanctions to be 
imposed? Another matter of interest is that not only was a due process hearing not automatically scheduled, 
but also when Appellants requested a hearing, the request was denied. 
With the suspension of Appellants visits, it must be noted that they were not allowed to challenge any 
evidence used against them; they were not allowed to offer evidence in their own behalf; and, they were not 
allowed to cross examine adverse testimony against them. The decision was completely arbitrary in nature 
and not appealable. Thus the only approach Appellants saw in reestablishing their visits, or even receiving a 
hearing, was through the court, hence, the filing of this action. 
Although initially not considered by Appellants, another way to obtain visits was possible. WL was 
transferred to ICC. It must also be especially recognized that after this transfer Appellants visiting and 
consortium privileges were restored. ML visited with her husband each week for an entire year without any 
incidents or noted security concerns to the institution. However, when submitting her yearly renewal form, as 
all visitors are required to do, ML's visiting privileges were again terminated. T l ~ s  occurred again without a 
hearing, without prior notice, and ordered again due to the same 2007 misdemeanor conviction. Appellants 
pointed out through appeal that P&P for misdemeanor offences are different than tl~ose of felony terminations, 
regarding the time a person has to wait before they can re-visit. Consequently, the reason for the denial 
changed from her 2007 arrest, to her 1997 employment as a contract vender. 
B. ARGUMENT 
It is undisputed that ML was a regular IDOC visitor for over twelve (12) years. Due to events resulting 
in a misdemeanor conviction she was denied visits from 12 April 07 to 20 July 07 (R., 151, and denied a due 
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process hearing or notice prior to the suspension of her visits. On 20 July 2007 Warden Blades reinstated 
ML's visiting privileges, which allowed her to visit her husband WT,. This allowance created a liberty 
Interest. Having an established privilege and liberty interest, ML visited her husband twice per week (at cach 
scheduled opportunity) throughout the summer. This distinguishes Appellants case as atypical from those 
simply applying for visiting approval. Appellants had an established Liberty Interest by visiting on a regular 
routine, moreover since warden Blades re-instated visiting created a Liberty Interest, which before visiting 
could be suspended; Appellants were due a hearing on the issues or institutional reason for suspension. 
The district court quoted Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 1984 when addressing the due process 
claim. "The Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution does not of its own force, create a liberty 
interest ... ",for it is well settled ,hat an inmate does not have a liberly iineresl in ihe denial of contact visits by 
a spouse, relatives, children, andfriends. " (R., 96) 
However, liberty interest can be created, Kv. Deut. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 461 
(1989) (R., 96) Had ML been applying for visitation and been denied, no liberty interest would exist. But this 
is not the case. Warden Blades had approved ML after his review and consideration of the situation. She was 
steadfastly visiting on a normal basis with our incident. When her visits were approved, and she was allowed 
to routinely visit, a liberty interest was created. (See Giano v. Selske 238 F.3d 223 (znd Cir 2001) and N& 
Camper 647 S.W. 2d 923 (MO. App. 1983)). To revoke the given privilege required due process. 
Using Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) the district court ruled (R., 97) that, "...to create a 
liberty interest, ihe action taken must be an aty~~ical nd signzjkant deprivation from the normal incidents of 
prison lSfe. " It is normal for potential visiting requests to be denied. It is also normal for an approved visitor, 
or inmate who commits a violation to temporarily lose their privileges. It is very abnormal and atypical for 
Appellants visiting to be suspended for fortyone (41) visits, before being reinstated, and then for the same 
offense to be suspended again permanently. When the previous warden had suspended, reviewed and 
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reinstated Appellants visiting privileges, punishment for that offense was completed. This abnormal and 
atypical deprivation from the normal incidents of prison life distinguishes and set this case apart from that of 
Sandin. It is clear by the visiting log that a liberty interest had been created. It is also clear and undisputed 
that no due process was given prior to suspending Appellants visiting. 
Throughout the duration of Appellants visiting history they have been targeted for harassment due to 
WL's classificatiori. On numerous occasions falsified documentation was placed in Appellants visiting file. 
It is imperative to point out that not once were Appellants given a hearing or chance to rebut this negative 
documentation. In fact, the largest majority was placed in the file without their knowledge. These falsified 
documents were accepted by the district court as being factual (R., 91 L33).' 
In the case of Schwartz v. Jones, 2001 WL 118600 (E.D. LA 2001), the court awarded damages when 
the actions of prison defendants did not serve a penalogical interest. Likewise, Appellants here had been 
visiting the entire summer without incident. When Defendant Hardison re-suspended Appellants privileges; it 
served no legitimate Penalogical interest. Furthermore, privileges were suspended, without prior notice, 
hearing, or any other form of due process. Appeliants' requests for a hearing were denied. 
DefendantsIRespondents in this ease believe that their decisions are beyond review. A similar belief 
occurred in Sharr, v. Westton, 233 F.3d 1166 ( 9 ~  Cir. 2000) there, the court held that "accepting such on 
argument [aJer defendants failed to comply with an injunction] would transfer the safguarding of 
constitutional rights , fom the courts to mental health professionuls" was not acceptable. Similarly, 
Defendants here believe they can arbitrarily do as they please. Appellants, in loosing established visiting 
privileges were entitled to due process. The loss of a privilege is a punishment, and punishments require due 
process 
In 2000, the loth Cir. Ruled that a prisoner's due process rights were violated when he was classified 
' At1 IDOC Sgt. has offered to testify if case goes to trial that prejudicial treatment existed toward Appellants from certain visiting 
officers, and that negative visiting documents were fictitiously created. 
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as a sex offender based on an allegation of rape. Chambers v. Colorado Deit. of Corrections, 205 F.3d 1237. 
The allegation was not prosecuted. The sex offender classification carried a consequence. The court ruled 
that this classification was something of valuc, which entitled him to procedural due process. 
Here, the district court's belief in falsified files, created without procedural due process, influenced 
their decision and Order (R., 91 L. 22). Not only were these unfounded allegations used against Appellants as 
reason to revoke visitation privileges, hut were done so without providing a revocation hearing. 
As Defendants apparently now realizes that they have violated Appellants Constitutional rights, 
according to Mendoza v. Blodm,  960 F.2d 1425, (gth Cir. 1993) held, a prisoner has liberty interest in 
visiting rights, and visitation can only be suspended under an enumerated list of circumstances, but only after 
a finding of guilt pursuant to a regular disciplinary hearing which requires that a written notice be---written 
noticc had to be given to inmates and visitor without, opportunity to review. Appellants were never afforded 
there due process rights to be heard, to a hearing, or protected Liberty Interest. 
In Defendants Brief (pg. 17) states that, because of MVs arrest of harboring a fugitive served a 
legitimate purpose of protecting the security of the institution; that Warden Hardison was acting with the 
penological purpose to preserve the safe, secure, and orderly operation of the facility. However, MVs due 
process was violated when she was presumed guilty of this charge before a trial of guilty plea. ML's 
conviction was not a felony of Harboring; it was finalized as being a misdemeanor with probation that is 
concluded with all fines paid. Defendants have denied Appellants visiting privileges based upon a fear that 
ML is a threat to the institution, which is could not have been the reason when Warden Blades reinstated 
visiting, and no additional problems occurred from the time Blades reinstated to the time warden Hardison 
suspended again. 
Appellants are aware of other women that have been approved and had worked for the institutions, 
been arrested, or even those on felony parole visiting a co-defendant, a1 of which have been allowed and 
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approved to visit. By warden Hardison suspending ML's visiting after warden Blades reinstated them, does 
not show a security concern since there had been no security problems after the reinstatement. It does 
however show harassing actions again by terminating Appellants visiting after warden Blades reinstatement. 
~ppellant's visitation is still suspended and they have been told indefinitely. This is a harsher sentencing and 
punishment than other wives or girlfriends have received, and there is no penological reasoning for this kind 
of treatment. ML has not created a security concern for the institutions. Just by being charged with a felony 
does not mean that the charges were correct in the action taken. ML was innocent until proven guilty in a 
court of law, and was not afforded that right. Even since the completion of her legal issues her visits are still 
being denied, and even though she has completed her probation without any further problems, Defendants still 
refuse her approval to visit her husband. With WL, having to serve out the remaining five years of his 
sentence, it is excessive punishment for Appellants to be separated for five years without seeing each other or 
through visitation. It is cruel and unusual punishment to expect a mamed couple to never see each other. 
Appellants refer to the courts ruling in, Berch v. Staltl, 373 F. Supp 412 (W.D. NC 1974) The Court 
held that interference with communication between inmate and his or her spouse may be unconstitutional as 
an infringement of rights of family relationship and privacy attached to activities relating to the family. 
Per IDOC visiting P&P 604.02.01.001, it states that visiting privileges can be terminated for five (5) 
years if charged with a felony, and if charged with a misdemeanor it is three (3) years. Appellant ML was 
charged with a felony, but her case ended with a misdemeanor. Since Defendants have not followed the P&P 
or Court Order to provide due process as required to do, Appellants hold that the termination of their visitation 
was unconstitutionally applied to their situation, but since even though the three years are not completed in 
April 2010, (as to the misdemeanor guidelines) their visiting should now be reinstated. However, Defendants 
continue to deny approval and now state it's indefinite. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 19. 
ISSUE 3 
DO APPELLANTS HAVE A LEGITMATE CLAIM FOR HARASSMENT AND RETALIATION? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In early 1997 ML worked five (5) months for Swansons Corp. and made commissary deliveries to the 
various local IDOC prisons as a contract vender (ICC did not exist at that time). Desiring to build a 
relationship with WL, ML quit her job at Swanson's commissary in August 1997. Five ( 5 )  months later they 
married. Because ML had worked Swanson's as a contract vender at SICI, certain IDOC officials opposed 
the marriage, and harassment of the Appellants began. 
After Appellants were manied on December 30, 1997 ML applied to visit, and was approved in 
January 1998, however after having only one (1) visit she was told they were recalculating her timetable, and 
her visits were terminated. 
In accordance with [DOC current P&P an ex-employee or contract vender had to wait six (6) months 
from their last employment before being allowed to visit a current inmate. Although Appellants had already 
waited six (6) months from when she quit her employment, in an atypical decision, ML was told to wait 
another six (6) months. IDOC decided to count from the time she applied, rather than from the date of her last 
employment as P&P stated. So Appellants did as asked and reapplied in June 1998. She was then approved. 
After just three (3) months, ML's visiting privileges were terminated again. The reason this time was 
that IDOC had convcniently rewritten the visiting policy stating that: all former conlract vendors with visiting 
privileges would be terminated, and could only be approved by the discretion of the warden. Although it was 
a new policy and violated expost facto law, it was retroactively applied to ML. 
Interestingly, there were several other women who temporarily lost their visiting, however, after 
appealing; they "all" were reinstated except for ML. Her visiting privileges were the only one still being 
denied. This showed the prejudicial, biased, and disparate treatment that made this an atypical case. It proved 
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that the new P&P was written directly targeting Appellants. 
Appellants were forced to hire an attorney to represent them concerning this new IDOC P&P. He 
arranged for a meeting with himself, ML, and Bonna Miller (IDOC director at the time). The results of that 
meeting were that ML would be allowed to visit with no contact for one (1) year. Then, if no problems arose, 
regular visits would resume. 
When the restricted year was up, instead of receiving normal visits, W1, was instead transferred on 25 
July 2000 to the newly built ICC prison. ML put her application in to visit him there and was approved. 
However, after only two (2) visits, ISCI warden Klauser contacted ICC and ML's visiting privileges were 
again terminated. 
ICC officers were very prejudice towards sex offenders, and WL was purposely placed in a unit where 
he was assaulted. IIe received a broken hand, a broken eye socket, cuts, and a severe concussion. After this 
attack, he was transferred to Orofino on 10 October 2000. Un-hindered by the distance, ML drove close to 
200 miles to Orofino every weekend and never missed a visit. Approximately six (6) months affer WL's 
transfer, realizing he was going to be kept, their ML also relocated to save on travel time, and expenses. 
Although Appellants visits had been restricted a full year, being at a new institution, in another atypical 
decision their visits were again restricted for the "initial year". 
In July 2001, when IDOC realized ML had permanently moved to Orofino they again transferred WL. 
This time, to Bonniville County jail in Idaho Falls. When Appellants fought this new separation, and blatant 
harassment they filed 1983 action. WL was returned back to Orofino March 2002 and the^1983 was ruled 
moot. Appellants were then allowed to visit until WL's release on parole in January 2004. In 2005 WL 
returned to prison on a parole violation of absconding. ML again applied for visits, and was approved. WL's 
absconding did not affect her visiting at that time. After close to three (3) months of visiting, serious 
harassment toward Appellants had begun. Appellants noted this in various complaints and concern forms to 
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IDOC and Warden Blades about the treatment they were receiving. (See Exhibit of conlplaints and DOR's). 
From September 2005 until now, Appellants have been subjected to abuse and harassment from IDOC and 
ICC Officials with no penological reasoning behind their decisions. Appellants' visiting is always the target. 
Any excuse is used to terminate Appellants only treasured time together. By being a member of a disfavored 
group, Appellants have been the targets for disparate treatment. 
B. ARGUMENT 
Appellants claimed that the termination of their visiting privileges was "aimed directly as a jbrm of 
harassment and retaliation" This was filed as claim I1 in both the Appellants original complaint (R., 13) and 
in the Amended Complaint (R., 38). Yet neither Defendants/Respondents nor the district court replied to this 
claim. In comparing the respondents reply with that of the courts order it is clear Claim I1 has never been 
answered. Therefore, this Court must recognize this action was filed as a valid Claim, which holds merit. 
Because Defendants failed to answer the claim, the district court should have granted the claim instead of 
coping Defendants' Memorandum. 
Defendants Redv Memorandum 
Statement of Facts 
Summary Judgment Standard 
Failure to Exhaust 
Defendants Reinke and Nelson 
Constitutional Rights 
Qualified Immunity 
Loss of Consortium 
(R., 122 Ex 7) 
(pg. 2) 
(pg. 3) 
@ g  4) 
(pg. 9) 
District Court Order (R., 71) 
Background (R., 71) 
Summary Judgment Standard (R., 73) 
Failure to Exhaust (R., 74) 
Director Reinke (R., 76) 
Steve Nelson (R., 76) 
Constitutional Rights (R., 77) 
Qualified Inmunity (R., 80) 
Loss of Consortium (R., 81) 
The record shows (R, 39-40) that WL was continually transferred form facility to facility. Appellants 
claim that these transfers were made out of harassment and retaliation to prevent visit between Appellants. 
The U.S. Courts have ruled that allegations made by Appellants are taken as true, and the Court must construe 
the complaint in the light most favorable to Appellants. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 41 1,421 (1996). 
The district court should have accepted Appellants claim as true. Furthermore, because defendants 
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failed to even respond to the claim, the district court should have accepted the allegations as true, and granted 
the claim by default, or proceed to trial by jury. Worse yet, as seen above, the district court's order follows 
thc Defendants Reply Memorandum item by item, and also fails to respond to the filed claim. 
Prior courts have accepted claims of transfer as retaliation, when raised as material issues of fact 
Rauso v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330 (3rd Cir. 2001). The district court although failing to respond to the issue or 
claim, does make reference to some of the retaliatory or harassing acts (R., 72-72). Yet these references are 
blind acceptance of fabricated reports as being true. The court failed to even consider that these same 
fabricated reports were actually events of retaliation. The issue of harassment remains in question. There is a 
genuine issue as to whether Defendants actions were retaliatory in nature and therefore, summary judgment 
should have been denied as a matter of law IRCP 56 (c) Because the evidence reveals that there are disputed 
issues of material fact, this also is reason beyond a question of law to deny summary judgment. First Sec. 
Bank ofldaho, N.A. v. Mur~ht ,  13 1 Idaho 787,790,964 P2d 654,657 (1998). 
In the case of Gentala v. City of Tucson, 213 F3d 1055 (9'h Cir. 2000) the court ruled that the "loss of 
a first amendment fieedom for even minimal period of time, constitutes "irreparable injury" for purpose of 
entitlement to injunctive relie$ " Defendants have been attempting to separate Appellants and interfering with 
their first amendment freedoms for years. When WL's parole was violated in October 2005, and he was re- 
incarcerated, the harassment continued. Separation could not be justifiably achieved directly through P&P so 
an indirect method of harassment and separation began. This harassment has been continually used to 
deceptively created a derogatory file, which is now currently being used as a penological reason to not only 
deny Appellants visit, but any chance of further parole as well. 
The court held in Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F3d 103, 107 (2"d Cir. 1999) that when determining 
whether a disciplinary sanctions is atypical and significant, the district court must review the particular 
conditions of confinement to which the Appellant was subjected. It is clear, that a continuous pattern of 
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harassment is visible. For Appellants to repeatedly be denied visiting for the same offence or to be harassed 
over a past employment from twelve (12) years ago is atypical. Additionally, to have visiting privileges 
"permanentlv" terminated is significant. For the district court to not address the issue or even respond to the 
claim is grounds for appeal, reversal, and remand. 
In the case of Allah v. Seiverling 229 F3d 220 (31d Cir. 2000) A claim was stated when prisoner, as 
retaliation, was placed in ad-seg resulting in reduced access to phone calls and inadequate access to legal 
research materials and assistance, ruled a denial of access to the courts. By denying visitation, Defendants 
have barred Appellants from private communication in forming strategies for their court cases. It is well 
settled that prisoners have a constitutional right to access to the courts for filing civil rights actions. This right 
to access to the courts is distinct from any liberty interest in remaining free form administrative segregation or 
detention. 
A First Amendment claim founded on the right to access remains viable after Sandin This holding is 
consistent with those of Pran v. Rowland, 65 F3d 802 806-07 (9th Cir. 1995) Babcock v. White, 102 F3d 
267, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1995) Thaddeus X v. Blatter, 175 F3d 378, 386 (6"' Cir 1999) and Crawford-El v. 
m, 93 F3d 813,826 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) reversed on other grounds, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) 
Appellants used visitation to develop case strategy and a plan of action for their claims. When 
Defendants denied their visits, it was not to serve as a penalogical interest, but to serve as harassment for their 
court cases, and to bar Appellants from having the time to develop that case strategy. Appellants went into 
greater detail in the first brief on the issues that they experienced. 
The 9th Cir. (1995) Ruled in Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F3d 912 the prisoner's allegations that a 
correctional officer cited him for a disciplinary violation because of his prior litigation activities would violate 
the equal protection clause. Any corroborating affidavits by fellow inmates to include not only testimony of 
other inmates, but of other visitors, and IDOC correctional staff as well. Furthermore, by the Defendants fail 
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to show a penalogical need for the atypical treatment. The court should have denied the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and scheduled a date for trial by jury. 
Defindants' Allegations on absconding to Belize 
In Defendants Responding brief Pg. 3, the State alleges: 
"On October 1, 2007, Warden Hurdiwn terrninuted Mrs. Lightner's 
visiling privileges base on her previous arrest and unresolved criminal charges. 
R., Ex. 4, at 8). The Lightners visiting privileges were also terminated bused on 
William Lightner :s history o f  abounding the country while on parole, along with a 
variely ofpast visiting issues involving the Lightners. (Id, 8-9). 
First, Appellants need to address that counsel for Defendants clearly knows he has never 
addressedlargued this in district court, tile absconding to Belize as being an issue to terminate Appellants 
visiting privileges. Appellant in this case, ML can contest that NEVER once was this issue mentioned to her 
when her visiting was terminated on 4-12-07 or 10-07. IN FACT, during the original termination on Aprill2, 
07 the only reason given to ML by Deputy Warden Christensen was issue of her arrest and nothing more. 
Nothing was ever said to ML, that the reasons were for going to Belize with her husband. For Dcfendants to 
now try to argue this and make it a reason of thinking in order to sway the court to believe they had a 
justifiable reason to do what they did, just substantiates their wrongdoing. Since Defendants never addressed 
this issue in district court this issue should not be given any consideration to courts decision. Appellants have 
never had anv opvortunihl to arme this in prior pleadin~s. 
Second, Appellant ML was never told by either warden during either termination that her clothes or 
visiting problems were an issue. The only thing said during the visitation terminations from both IDOC 
officials were targeted toward the arrest. Nothing more! If the clothes andlor other related issues or concerns 
were of valid Defendants (as Mr. Kubinski points out) would have acted on them prior to the termination on 
April 12, 07. This is an exaggerated response to the issues at hand and carries weight to the real issues of 
I this case. 
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Other visiting issues mentioned are concerning problems that Appellants have had, and dealt with by 
filing formal complaints on numbers visiting guards at ISCI for harassment and retaliation. These are the 
"past visiting issues" that Mr. Kubinski refers to. Appellants have attempted on many occasions to bring 
these harassment issues to officials and be treated fairly in visiting. However, when coming hack fiom 
Belize, the harassinent fiom sorne visiting officers became over whelming aid hard to deal with so Appellants 
filed complaints to address the negative and threatening actions, which caused even greater retaliation, to 
include this April 12-07 termination. 
ISSUE 4 
DID THE DEPENDANTS ACTIONS VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
RULE? AND SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE MADE A 
RULING ON THIS ISSUE? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On or about April 12 2007 ML's visiting was terminated. Then after writing a letter appealing the 
termination to Warden Blades, he approved the request. He asked that ML keep ISCI appraised on the 
changes in her case, and reinstated Appellants visiting. 'Three months, later warden Hardison took over as new 
warden at ISCI replacing Blades. During the three month reinstatement, there were no new issues, concerns, 
or complaints relating to their visiting. Neither had anything new in ML's case occurred to report on. She was 
still waiting the pre-trial date to arrive. 
When Hardison took over as warden he reversed warden Blades' decision and terminated Appellants 
visiting for the same issue they had been terminated on 12 April 2007, and done so without due process. 
THE ISSUE IS NOT ONLY DOUBLE JEOPARDY BUT INCLUDES THE COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL RULE AS WELL: 
I Double Jeopardy: 
It is clear that Appellants made a claim of Double Jeopardy violations (R., 15 and 40). It is also a 
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statement of fact that the district court failed to respond to the issue. Respondent's have claimed that "Bejbre 
an appellant may assert an i ,~ .~ue  on appeal, he must obtain and udverse ruling on that issue from the trial 
court State v. Fislter, 123 Idaho 481,485, 849 P 2.d 942,946 (1993)." (Respondent's Brief p. 22) 
Appellants claim that the issue demands a reply from the courts, and requests this higher court to 
remand the issue back to the district court, for a finding to the complaint. It is an injustice to Appellants and 
a fundamental error for the district court not to make a ruling, creating an estoppel to appeal on the 
unanswered constitutional issue brought forth in the complaint. 
It is further stated in Summary Judgment by Respondents that the Double Jeopardy claim is a result of 
retaliation. (Respondents Brief pp 22-23) yet the Double Jeopardy claim made by Appellants is distinct and 
completely separate from that of retaliation. (Appellants Brief p. 5). The Double Jeopardy claim arises from 
having visits suspended and punished twice the same offence without being afforded due process. This being 
a fact and matter of law demands a reply distinctly separate from that of retaliation. 
The Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment is not related to retaliation, but provides that "no 
person shall be ... subject,for the same ofknse to be twice put in,jeopardy qf'ltfi or limb". 1t is highly disputed 
that the termination of Appellants visiting privileges constituted a second punishment and prosecution for the 
same offense, while Respondents claim that the second punishment was "the result of a discretionary 
administrative decision " (Respondents Briefp. 24) it is still a denial ofprivileges and a punishment. 
As stated earlier, Appellants had an established liberty interest. To deny that established interest is 
punishment. To do it twice, four months apart is a violation of Double Jeopardy, and the claim should be 
granted by authority of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Collateral Estoppel Rule: 
The Respondents continue to ignore the fact that Appellant Marcia Lightner (Marcia) may have been 
charged with the offense of harboring a fugitive, Marcia was not convicted of the offense; and until one is 
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convicted one is considered innocent and may not be punished simply for being charged. Respondent 
Hardison punished Marcia for being charged with the offense and it matters not what the policies and 
procedures may hold regarding this issue; it's still against the law to punish Marcia by terminating her visits 
after Warden Blades whom had full knowledge of the pending charge reinstated them. Warden Blades 
resolved this fact in Appellants' favor and as such, the Respondents cannot raise this fact due to the colkcterul 
estoppel rule. See Dudnev v. Alameida, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29506 at [*12]. 
ISSUE 5 
ARE DEFEDANTS ENTILED TO OUALIFIED IMMUNUTY? 
OUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
Defendants are personally liable in this $1983 action if they knew or should have known that they 
were violating Appellants federal rights. See, Harlow v. Fitzrerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Anderson, 
Creiakton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Appellants explain their answer to the question of whether Defendants are 
entitled to claim qualified immunity. In Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392 (9''' Cir. 1990). State officials 
can only claim qualified immunity when they are engaging in discretionary acts. but here, Defendants were 
required to perform specific acts in which they had no discretion. Therefore, the qualified immunity defense 
is not available. In Alexander v. Perrill, for example, the Ninth Circuit refused to consider a claimed defense 
of qualified immunity made by prison officials because the act they allegedly failed to perform--calculating a 
prisoner's sentence-was specifically required of them by the state law, Id. 916 F.2d 1399 11. 22. In so 
holding, the court relied on its prior ruling in Johnson V, Duf&, 588 F.2d 740,743 (9Ih Cir. 1978): 
[Ulnder 5 1983 the qualified immunity defense is inapplicable whenever an 
official 'does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or 
omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 
deprivation [of an individual's rights].' [Citing Johnson v. Duffy.] Under 9 
1983 when an official fails to take an action that he has a clearly established 
duty to take and that failure is a foreseeable contributing factor to the violation 
of a Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the defense is similarly unavailable. 
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Alexander, 9 16 F.2d at 1 396. See also, Cooper v. Du~nik,  963 F.2d 1220, 1250-51 (9"' Cir. 1992) 
(en banc); Redman v. Countv of  §an Diem, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, Appellants 
prima facie showing that defendants (who carried a position of authority has not performed these mandatory 
acts sufficient to defeat her claim of qualified immunity. Alexander v. Perrill; Johnson v. Duffy. For this 
reason alone, Defendants claim of qualified immunity must be denied; as demonstrated below, there is 
abundant evidence that Defendants have not performed their legal duties. 
Even if we employ the standard analysis and view Defendant's acts as discretionary, the 
conclusion is the same. After all, Defendants knew (or should know) that U.S. Constitutional law supersedcs 
any idealistic excuse for any person to hinder and violate another persons Fourteenth Amendment Right to 
Due process, the right to be heard, created liberty interest is protected. U.S. Constitutional rights of an 
inmatelparoleelor family member should always be recognized as their guaranteed right and not perceived as a 
privilege that has to be earned. The IDOC officials should bc rcrninded of the importance of providing 
Constitutional safegwds to ensure their actions do not infringe upon that protected right of those they are in 
supervision over, or as in this case lack of professional conduct and abuse of digression and authority. 
Those procedural safeguards are aimed at enhancing the reliability and quality of the fact-finding 
process of decisions that play a critical part in rehabilitation. The U.S. protected Constitutional Fourteenth 
Amendcd right holds and affirms that a prisoner or visitor has a sufficient interest, and due process 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and Idaho Constitution art. 1, 5 13. Are affirmed as well, that 
unless IDOC can overcome the "Restrictions and reasonably and necessurily related to the advancement of 
Tome justifiable purpose of imprisonment", Defendants have no case. For their reasoning's are not justifiably 
applied to approve and reinstate visitation then deny it for the same reasons without any further incidents from 
Appellants. With that being said, in Dcfendants "termination of visiting with out a hearing or prior notice, or 
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right to be heard" being utilized and applied, there was no "reasonably and necessarily related lo the 
advancement of some jusii$ahle purpose of impri.~onment". Meaning, that Defendants reasoning was not 
necessarily related to any justifiable purpose that had anything to do with Appellants visiting suspension. 
On November 14,2008 a District court hearing was held. (See transcripts pg. 9-10, line 14-19) where 
Appellant WL tried to gain information from Defendants as to what Defendant Hardison was basing his 
decision on for reasons of suspending our visits, that he based it on his own discretion, and that the reason for 
making his decision cannot be found in a policy and procedure? Appellant WL co~itinued (on pg 10 line 1-23) 
stating: 
"What was your penological reasoning for suspending our visits?' And in 
Defendants response to the interrogatory question was, "Pursuant to IDOCpolicy 
and procedure SOP 601-02-01,001, the,facility has discretion to lerminate those 
same privileges. " Appellant WL followed by stating, "So just by quoting the 
number of a policy andprocedure doesn't tell what he is basing that decision on. 
Facts are, there was no Penological reasoning applied to this termination. Appellant ML stated (transcripts pg. 
53 -54) that: 
"When warden Hardison made the decision as appellate authoriw, he was the 
final decision make?; and no procedure is available,for the grievance. The policy 
gives many steps@ the prison oflcial to take upon receiving any grievance, but 
it does not give any steps after the warden had made his decision. So if there is 
something that gives Bill the auihority or ihe right or whatever in the police or 
procedure, it is not set our for anybody to review, read, qffollow through with 
when the warden has ultimate control in decision power on that decision. 
To continue this argument, (see transcript pg 53, line 17-25 and pg. 54 line 1-25). Appellants conclude 
that when Warden Hardison called ML on October 1,2007 and told her he was suspending her visits (without 
a hearing or any right to be heard prior to a suspension, after a liberty interest had been created). ML made 
her appeal to him at that time and (line 21) he states "...he mentioned the policy and that his decision was 
,final". The felony charge did not stick, after ML's case was completed it was misdemeanor and should have 
been changed as such and visiting reinstated per IDOC Policy, 
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Appellants contend that there is no way to grieve the warden after he was the final appellate authority 
on the phone the day he talked to ML and suspended her visits. Defendant's argument is weak on this issue 
because the warden was the last authority to grieve and he is the one that made the decision. 
Defendants counsel argues that Appellants could have appealed the Wardens decision, (however ML 
did and was turned down an meeting with tile director) and goes on to state that (see transcripts pg 55 Iine15- 
25), "Pursuant to that SOI: the IDOC director is not involved in the grievance process. " If that is the case, 
how can Appellants grieve someone who is not involved in the grievance process? It can not be done. It 
shows that the IDOC policy on the grievance process is contradicting when the director himself does not 
recognize he is a part of the grievance process, he stated in his interrogatories and responses. Defendant 
Hardison called himself the appellate authority when speaking to ML, (see Tr. pg. 51 lines 1-13) and Jill 
Whittington confinns this through IDOC directives. 
Defendant's counsel argued (Tr. pg 40, line 15-25) states that: 
"In this case, the Lightners or more specifically Mr. Lightner did not choose to 
follow ihe grievance process. Hex Warden Hardison is the guy who made the 
decision so I don t need to jdlow through." Well, first qf all, there is nothing in 
the grievance process ... that says that you cannot grieve the warden. " 
However bazaar this statement is to Appellants, the grievance process to grieve the wardens decision 
that Mr. Kubinski states was available, simply was not, and he could not provide and policy and procedure 
that upheld his argument eithcr. As stated above, Appellants have shown the court that there was no avenue to 
grieve the Wardens decision. It must be mentioned her also that Mr. Kubinski mentions that "...more 
spec~~cully Mr Lightner did not choose to follow ... ", but Mrs. Lightner did contact the IDOC to try and meet 
with Director Reinke and was refused that opportunity when Jeff Zumuta acted in his stead and stood by 
Hardisons decision without offering any opportunity to bring forth her case and circumstances. 
By choosing to impose direct action on Appellants by suspending their visiting privileges after they were 
reinstated form warden Blades violated Appellants Rights to procedural Due Process. Defendants failed in their 
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duty to perform under the law by: "when an o$icialfail.~ to take an action thal he has a clearly established 
duty to take and that ,failure is a foreseeable contributing factor to the violation of Appellants constitutional 
rights, the defense is similar13 
When the law is clear, as it is here, Defendants disobeyed that law, they did so at their peril. They 
therefore should enjoy no qualified immunity. See Ward v. County of §an Diecro, 791 F.2d 1329 (9" Cir. 1986) 
(When decisional law notifies jail officials that prisoners may not be strip searched in certain situations, jailer 
who ignores that notice is not entitled to qualified immunity); VaueItan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736 (9" Cir. 
1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1075 (1989) (when prison officials use more force on inmates than decisional law 
allows, they lose qualified immunity); Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321 (9" Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 
U.S. 1075 (1989) (district court properly denied claimed immunity of prison officials who used a more 
intrusive search of prisoner than decisional law allowed); DiMartini v. Ferrin, 889 F.2d 922 (9'h Cir. 1990) 
cert. denied 11 1 S. Ct. 2796 (1 990) (officials who ignores decisional law and informs employer of alleged - I 
wrongdoing by employee is not entitled to qualified immunity); Kraus E Counfv o f  Pierce, 793 F. 2d 1105 
(9" Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987) (police officers lose qualified immunity when they violated 
clearly established rights of Plaintiff in making arrest); Felix v. McCartha 939 F2d699 (91h Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1165 (1992) (prison guard is not entitled to qualified immunity when he uses more force 
than permitted under decisional law); Cooper v. Duunik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9" Cir 1992) (police officers who 
ignore suspect's rights under Miranda are not entitled to qualified immunity, given that the law was clearly 
established at the time of Defendant's actions). In this case the Constitution of the United States should have 
been recognized by Defendants. After all, it is not new by any means. Ignorance of the law should give no 
favor to those who do not make themselves aware of the law. IDOC policy and procedures should have a 
secured P&P to cover the rights of other. As well the Court should recognize and hold that in Owens v. Kellev 
I 
681 F.2d 1362, proves Appellants argument. 
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Supported in standard it protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate law."& at 536. To clarify, either Defendants have never read those decisions, in which case they are 
plainly incompetent, or they have deliberately chosen to disobey them. Whichever is true, they are not 
entitled to qualified immunity. "If Defendants have violated clearly established law, helshe will generally be 
liable." Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F. 2d 1392, 1396 (9'h Cir. 1990), here, the law has been clearly established, 
and Defendants are liable for any violation of that law that deprived Appellants of their constitutional right. In 
this case, Defendants clearly and deliberately ignored their responsibilities as a Governmental authority and 
violated Appellants of their U.S. Constitutional rights to Due process, a created liberty interest and their right 
to be heard. 
The burden, of course, is on the Defendants to prove that they are entitled to defense of qualified 
immunity. Harlow, 4567 U.S. at 819; Houphton v. South. 965, E2d 1536 (91h Cir. 1992). In this context, 
then, Defendants must show that they were faithfully complying with clearly established law. The clearly 
established law that Defendants were required to obey was, U.S. Constitutional law guaranteed to protect 
Appellants rights, which is the Supreme law of the land. And Defendants have the burden of showing 
compliance with it. 
The "proof" submitted by Defendants would be laughable if the subject were not so tragic. They 
submitted no written policies and procedures that uphold a person their liberty interest due process rights are 
being enforced. They submit no testimony upholding legal foundation that supersedes the Constitutional 
Fourteenth Amendment right. They submit no documents proving their contention of qualified immunity. 
Appellants deserved their full guaranteed right to the safeguards of due process that ensures their 
constitutional rights to a hearing and notice to be heard, applying their created Liberty Interest, are fulfilled 
rcgardless of Defendants personal wontedness or vendetta to suspend Appellants visiting. In Alexand~r v. 
Pevrifl, 916 F 2d 1392, 1398 (9"' Cir. 1990) (court quickly cites to the fact that Defendants prison officials' 
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"duties are clearly established by virtue or the Bureau of Prisons regulations and Policies which they were 
legally obligated to perform.") Here, as in Alexander, we do not have to look hither and yon when the answer 
is staring us in the face. The clcarly established law that Defendants were required to obey is the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to U.S. Constitution, and Defendants have the burden of showing compliance with it. 
ISSUE 6 
DID DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSAL OF IIEFENDANT REINKE? 
.AND. SIIOL'LD DEFENDANT IfARDISON REMAIN A P.4RTk' TO THE ACTION BECtiLISE HE 
DIED? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Defendants Response Brief pg. 12, argument is raised on, (1) Dismissal of Reinke in the 1983 Law 
suite. (2) Whether warden Hardison is still a party to the action because he has passed away. 
Appellants' argument is: (1) Appellants named Reinke, Hardison and Nelson on the Notice of appeal, 
notifying the court that they are taking the position that these Defendants will be addressed in their appeal 
process. (2) The fact that Warden Hardison has died is of no legal concern to this case. His successor is the 
liable party to the action per Idaho Rule 25(d). 
Court abused its Discretion in dismissing Defendant Reinke: 
 ellants ants presented their argument to the district court as to Director Reinke's responsibilities as 
being the Director of the [DOC holds a position of "supervi.sing liability", which is the ultimate authority, and 
controlling individual that employees have to answer to. Because Defendant Reinke supervises or has taken 
responsibility through his position as Director, he is liable and directly responsible for the actions of those 
who work under him. 
According to Idaho Rules orevidence 201, Appellants request the cou~t  take judicial notice on the district record, "Motion for 
reconsideration, on courts disnlissal of Reinke as Defendant. Appellants have also filed a Motion for the court to take judicial 
notice as well. 
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Appellants argued this extensively in district court (Tr. pgs. 57-58-59) stated: "Stating a claim and--- 
in the reply memorandum of the summary judgment, Mr. Kubinski mentions the plaintiffs failed to proffer 
any evidence in the record establishing Director Reinke's participation. When in fact, ML contacted IDOC to 
meet with the director and was referred to Jeff Zumuta. ML pleaded with him for an appointment with the 
director and he would not set the appointment with her. Being the Chief of Prisons his position was directly 
under the Director. Because of Reinke's failure to act, it caused plaintiffs' damage. Jeff Zumuta acted in 
place of the Director which holds the Director responsible for not acting himself." 
Policy says he (Director) is to handle grievances, yet Defendants have stated he doesn't. Defendant 
Reinke is responsible for not taking action when we tried to grieve this to him. It is called "Supervisor 
liability". Same as if there was a company party and people drive home drunk from the party, if they get into 
a wreck, the company is held liable for the actions of that employee, and sued.. 
These theories of law are supported in Watkins v. CiOI of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093, (9"' Cir 
1998). A supervisors' approval of subordinate's request to commit an act that may be unconstitutional, may 
cause supervisor to lose qualified immunity. Another case, TnvIor v. List, 880, F2d 1040, (9th Cir. 1998), 
alleging that the supervisor failed to properly train or supervise personnel that led to the deprivation of 
constitutional rights or by alleging that the defendant knew of the alleged misconduct and failed to act to 
prevent further misconduct, states a 1983 claim. In Fiilfer v. Oakland, 47 F3d 1523 or 1528-29 (9" Cir. 
1995). Court held that supervisor had an obligation to investigate allegations of lawful, unlawful conduct and 
to take prompt corrective action suficient not only to end the current unlawful conduct but also to deter 
further wrongful conduct. In Barm V. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 SD Cal. (1997) A supervisor may be 
liable for constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in, directed, or knew of the 
violation, or failed to act or prevent them, also if evidence of suffice the allegations of knowledge and failure 
to act, supported by the correspondent evidence, indicating that the defendants had necessary notice. 
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When ML made her appeal to IDOC and requested a meeting with Director Reinke, and was 
intercepted by Jeff Zumuta, ML was informed that he would not make the appointment and was denied. 
Therefore, the negligent acts of Director Reinke's staff are not sufficient when Defendant Reinke failed to act. 
Because of the position he holds as Director of the IDOC, and because P&P as well as a court Order to 
enforce due process was in place, he was obligated to hear Appellants appeal aid review the grievance, and he 
did nothing. 
Defendant Hardison sltould remain agar@ to the action, regardless of his death: 
In the district Court, Defendants filed a Memorandum for Summary Judgment 21 November 2008 but 
did not ague the issue of Defendant Hardison passing in their issues or arguments. Yet Defendants mention it 
in their Reply Brief, which Defendant Hardison died Oct. 2008. Because this was not addressed at the district 
court, Defendants are barred by malting an issue of this in briefing. 
In addition, Idaho Rule 25(d). Public officers-Death or separation from office, holds: "When a public 
oficer in an official capacity i,s party to an action and during its pendency dies, resigns, or olherwi,se ceases 
to hold oflce, the action shall he continued and maintarned by or against the oJficer:s successor" 
Defendant Hardison has died; however, that does not (by Idaho law) relieve Defendants from their liability. 
When Appellants visiting termination took place, Defendant Hardison was very much alive and a party to the 
action, and he was very much involved in the final appellate authority decision making process which was 
done without affording Appellants their due process hearing after their Liberty Interest was created by 
Warden Blades reinstatement. Since Defendant Hardison has left his position at the prison (ISCI), the prison 
did not cease to function or close down; his position was replaced by another to cany on. Idaho Rule 25(d) 
give Appellants assurance that, When a public officer in an official capacity i~ party to an action and during 
itr pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold ofJce, the uction shall he continued and maintained bv 
or anainst the officer :s successor Per Idaho Rule, the Court is legally obligated by law to keep Defendant 
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Hardison as a Defendant and a party to the action or his successor in this case. Just because he has passed 
away, this gives no legal authority to remove him from this case. 
ISSUE 7 
ARE DEFENDANTS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES? 
PLRA and 28 USC 1915. The statute states, in part, 28 USC (b) "(4) In no event shall aprisoner he 
prohibited from bringing a civil action ...fo r the reason that the prisoner has no u~srts and no means by 
which do pay the initialfilingfee. " The Federal Appellate and District Courts have held the "safety valve" 
provision of the PLRA applied to the prisoner's initial fee and that the prisoner should be allowed to proceed 
with his action. See Tavlor v. Delatoore, 281 F3d 844 (9th Cir. 2002); Norton v. Dimaznna, 122 F3d 286 
(5fh Cir. 1997)(held that prisoners will have access to court regardless of their incomes); Farese v. Scherer, 
342 F3d 1223 (1 lth Cir. 2003)(held that section 1915 applied only in a suit where the prisoner proceeds 
without "prepayment of fees or security therefore."). Appellant Marcia Lightner is on disability and to 
burden her with the costs of Attorney's fees could very well place her in a homeless situation. Also in Smith 
v. State of Idnho, Idaho S.Ct. 33254 has held and substantiated that Appellants procedural due proceeds rights 
were violated. 
Appellants have filed a lawsuit that has merit and due process, liberty interest claims which have 
violated their constitutional due process rights to a hearing or notice prior to their visitation being terminated. 
Appellants have shown this court that they have claims that can be challenged, and these claims are not of a 
frivolous nature. Nor was this lawsuit filed for frivolous reasons. Appellants have paid all their court, and 
appeal fees to bring forth their claims, thereby showing good cause in seeking justice where they feel justice 
has failed in this case. To burden Appellants who are basically indigent and to force payment of additional 
court costs and fees because Appellants filed a lawsuit on Defendants is an appealable issue for this court to 
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address on appeal. Because Appellants have stated sound claims and shown Due process violations of their 
right to be heard and liberty interests did in fact occurred in this case, Appellants have shown this case is not 
of a frivolous nature therefore Defendants request for Attorney's fees should be denied on any outcome or 
decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants' rights were violated in that punishment was handed out without giving them a due process 
hearing. They were not allowed to call witnesses, or to rebut testimony or evidence used against them. 
Neither were they allowed to provide evidence in their on behalf. They were denied the basic right of 
confronting their accusers. While WL does loose any of his at the prison gate, due process is not one of them. 
Furthermore, offense was issued against ML, who is dot an inmate and retains all her rights. 
When Appellants Consortium was denied Defendants also effectively hindered their right to access the 
court. The use of mail and telephones is not only extreme expensive, but also it gives Defendants an unfair 
advantage. It allows them recorded access to Appellants strategies. History records show that President 
Nixon was convicted in Water Gate. How politically small does a person need to be before their rights 
don't matter? And they no longer can pursue the right of happiness? 
Because of the nature of WL's criminal charge, certain select IDOC officials targeted him for 
harassment. Coupled with a VSP label this harassment escalated the rights violations. Married to WL, ML 
has had to endure and suffer the same harassment and haltered from which hate crimes stem. This issue is not 
restricted to this case alone. In the distant past, society went on which hunts trying to destroy anyone they 
could place in that catcgory. In today's society it is sex offenders. The classification may be different, but the 
results are the same. Those classified, as sex offenders are harassed and undergo all forms of mistreatment. 
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Based upon the issues brought before the court, Appellants plead to this court for a reversal in this 
case. Appellants seek justice in this matter that their visiting will be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted this 2 fxy  of January 2010. / 
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